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Crime Underreporting: Theory and Implications
for the Statistical Analysis of Crime
Introduction
During the past ten years we have witnessed a great increase in
both public concern regarding crime levels and in professional concern
directed towards the analysis of crime, its causes, its effects and
the appropriate policies for its social control. This heightened con-
cern has also resulted in a greater interest in the measurement of
crime; crime—unlike many other phenomena— is 'observed' by most people
only through official statistics. Since most people are not direct
victims of criminal acts, 'crime waves'—unlike severe winters or high
rates of inflation—are communicated to the general public only by
statistics. Further, these statistics are based for the most part, on
voluntary reports of the victims of crimes and then 'validated' by
police departments before they become public knowledge.
Because of this process, particularly the reliance upon voluntary
reporting by victims, criminologists have long believed that there
exists a large amount of unreported crime, the so-called 'Dark Figure'
of crime. However, it was not until the introduction of victimization
surveys of the general population in the early 1970' s that the magni-
tude of the Dark Figure was documented. These surveys have found that
overall only a third of all victimizations are reported to the police
[15; Table 89]. However, the findings of the victimization surveys
had implications not only for documenting the magnitude of the level
of crime but for the analvsis of crime as well.
The last ten years has also seen a great increase in the scholarly
interest in crime, an interest which has also become much more inter-
disciplinary than in the past. In particular, economists and political
scientists have joined criminologists and sociologists in the analysis
of crime. Economists, in particular, have also brought alternative
theoretical and methodological approaches to the area. The traditional
focus of analysis on offenders—their characteristics and motives— has
been supplemented by a more macro approach, the analysis of crime rates
in populations using causal models based on economic theory. This new
empirical emphasis has given an additional significance to the phenomena
of crime underreporting in addition to the accurate measurement of crime
rates for descriptive purposes.
All statistical analyses of crime rates based upon the 'economic
model' of crime have as a central theoretical assumption the deterrence
hypothesis. This is the assumption that criminals
—
potential and
actual—are sufficiently rational that the threat of punishment will
influence their decision to engage in criminal acts. Consequently,
this theory predicts that there should be an inverse relationship be-
tween the threat of punishment, measured by certainty and/or severity,
and the rate of crime, other factors held constant. The question of
whether a significant number of criminal acts is the result of rational
choice, of course, has immediate policy implications. If the deter-
rence hypothesis is correct, then increasing the threat of punishment
should, in theory, offer an effective means of controlling the level
of crime.
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The majority of the statistical analyses of crime rates which intro-
duce the deterrence hypothesis have produced results consistent with the
hypothesis, i.e., they find an inverse relationship between the crime
rate and the level of punishment, measured by certainty and/or severity.
Nevertheless, these findings have been given conflicting interpretations.
The researchers themselves generally interpret the findings as empirical
confirmation of the deterrence hypothesis. Others who have reviewed the
same findings are more skeptical in accepting the deterrence hypothesis
[5], [10]. The Panel on Research on Deterrence and Incapacitive
Effects of the National Academy of Sciences has recently subjected a
large number of these statistical analyses to a searching methodologi-
cal critique. The Panel concluded:
In summary, therefore we cannot yet assert that the evi-
dence warrants an affirmative conclusion regarding de-
terrence. We believe that scientific caution must be
exercised in interpreting the limited validity of the
available evidence and the number of competing explana-
tions for the results. [2; 7]
One of the competing explanations, accorded much weight by the Panel,
was based upon the phenomena of unreported crime. It has been shown
that if the rate of unreported crime varies randomly across populations
comprising the sample and if the deterrence variable is a ratio with
the crime rate in the denominator (e.g., the percent of crimes cleared
by arrest, the arrest rate per crime, the average prison sentence per
crime, etc.) then the random variation in the underreporting rate can
induce a negative correlation between the crime rate and the deterrence
variable [6], [14]. Thus, there exists the possibility that the findings
of a negative relationship in the statistical studies using such deter-
rence variables may be in part or entirely a statistical artifact.
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However this impact of underreporting is dependent upon two con-
ditions: that there is random variation in the underreporting ratio
between populations in the sample and that the measure of deterrence
includes the crime rate in the denominator. In addition to this
potential for confounding the statistical results there exists two
other general impacts of underreporting on statistical models of crime
rates utilizing multiple regression techniques. The first, and most
general, is that underreporting introduces measurement error in the
dependent variable. If this error was non-stochastic it would affect
only the constant term but not the estimated coefficients; however, if
it was purely stochastic (i.e., purely random) then the additional
variability imparted by the variation in the measurement error would
increase the standard errors of the coefficients and thus increase the
possibility that a true relationship would be undetected. Consequently,
in general, random underreporting error may either artifactually pro-
duce support or rejection of the deterrence hypothesis.
A second source of potential difficulties caused by underreporting
is based on the assumption that the underreporting error is stochastic
but with a systematic component, i.e., it is not purely random. If
the rate of underreporting is dependent upon either the rate of crime
in the population or any of the independent variables in the crime
rate equation, then one or more of the coefficients in the regression
equation will be biased.
The primary purpose of this paper is to explore the possibility
:hat crime underreporting may be explained by systematic factors, i.e.,
that the variation in observed crime reporting ratios between cities
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is not purely random. We approach Che question by first specifying a
theory of crime underreporting that may be applied to populations
—
cities. When this theory is confronted with data we find that there
does exist a systematic component to the variation in underreporting.
We then explore the implications of this systematic component as a
source of bias to coefficients in two typical regression models used
to analyze crime rates.
A Theory of Crime Underreporting
One of the major objectives of the National Crime Survey was to ob-
tain information from victims regarding their decision to report or not
to report their victimization to the police. In the 1975 survey, the
major reasons given for failure to report were:
Reason Given
Nothing could be done; lack of proof
Not important enough
Police would not want to be bothered
Private or personal matter
Source: [15; Table 98]
.
All Personal All Househould
Crimes Crimes
29.9% 36.2%
25.4 29.1
6.1 9.0
5.4 5.2
Because of the very general nature of these answers, the survey data
have been analyzed to determine which major objective characteristics
of the event and the victim are correlated with the reporting deci-
sion. The motivation of these studies has been to advance our know-
ledge of 'victimology'—characteristics of victims, the impact of crime
on them, and their interrelationship with the criminal justice system.
The motivation of this paper, however, is primarily to explore the
implications of non-reporting for the analysis of crime rates. In
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victimology studies, the unit of observation has been the individual
rather than populations; nevertheless, the results of these studies
are a useful starting paint for our analysis.
The major finding of this analysis has been that the degree of non-
reporting differs significantly among crime types; that the character-
istic of the victimization event, within crime type, is a better pre-
dictor of nonreporting than the characteristics of the victim, e.g.,
age, race, income, educational level and marital status [9]. Age was
the only victim characteristic found to be important. The important
characteristics of the victimization event for predicting reporting
are: seriousness of the victimization (monetary loss or injury), or
the use of a weapon. In addition to these objective factors some
studies have explored the role of attitudes of the victims toward the
criminal justice system as a factor in nonreporting, in particular
their attitudes toward the police [8], [12]. One study confirmed the
major importance of seriousness as an explanatory /ariable, but found
that for ".c less serious crimes attitudinal variables are also impor-
tant. The variables include: the victims involvement in the com-
munity, the belief that the police will be able to catch the offender,
and the victim's trust in the police.
Our theory of crimp sporting decision is based upon the weighting
of the perso'-^x costs and benefits to the victim of reporting. The
benefits may be grouped into three classes:
i) recovery of stolen property for property crimes
ii) increased future safety from apprehension of the offender.
This would also include a concern for other potential
victims
—
good citizenship— as well as for oneself.
iii) retribution, a desire to have the offender apprehended and
punished as a matter of just deserts.
The personal costs would include the following:
i) the cost in lost time and perhaps lost income from report-
ing and possible subsequent involvement as a witness,
ii) psychological unpleasantness of involvement with the police,
i.e., the possibility of not being believed and embarrassment
from admission of culpability or carelessness,
iii) personal cost that reporting might have in subsequent rela-
tionships with the offender, e.g., fear of reprisal or an
emotional tie to the offender.
This general framework, limited by data availability, is imple-
mented by the following variables or proxy variables. The economic
benefits are measured by the average property loss for each type of
crime; the higher the average loss the greater potential return from
reporting the matter to the police. Also, police efficiency in reco-
vering the property should also be a consideration. The most direct
measure of this would be the percent of stolen property recovered for
each type of crime. However, this is not available for all cities,
and then it is available only for all property crimes, not specific
crimes. Another source of benefits is increased future safety if
the offender is apprehended. This concern for future safety would
increase the probability of reporting the higher the perceived risk.
of victimization and the more efficient the police. The risk of
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victimization is measured by the reported crime rate and police effi-
ciency is measured by the arrest clearance rate as well as the subjec-
tive evaluation of police performance.
The personal cost of reporting crime cannot be readily captured
with any precision, given available data at the city level. But two
proxy variables are used, the first is the number of police per capita,
The greater the number of police, the less time required in searching
and/or waiting for a police officer to appear. The second is the sub-
jective evaluation of the quality of the local police. The more posi-
tive this evaluation, the less threatening would be the contact with
the police.
Data and Estimation Results
The basic city sample was defined by the 26 cities in which victim-
ization surveys have been conducted from 1971 through 1975. Of these
26 cities, 13 have been surveyed twice and 13 surveyed only once [17],
[18], [19]. Thus a pooled sample could produce at most 39 obser-
vations. However, missing data from the Uniform Crime Reports reduced
the available sample size to 30. The National Crime Survey data pro-
vided both the crime reporting ratios for each city by crime type and
a measure of the city population' s opinion about local police perfor-
mance [20], This portion of the survey asked each respondent to eva-
luate local police performance as 'good', 'average', or 'poor'. We
have used the percent responding 'good' as our measure of the subjec-
tive evaluation by the city population of their police.
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Table 1 presents Che results of regressions using as the dependent
variable the crime reporting ratio for all property crimes and four
specific property crimes. Turning first to the reporting ratio for
all property crimes, reporting behavior was significantly related to -
only two of the six variables. These were the property crime rate and
the number of police per capita; both coefficients have a positive
sign as predicted by the theory. These results are consistent with
the hypotheses that people tend to report crimes to a greater extent
the more serious the crime problem is in their city—at least as mea-
sured by property crimes known to the police—and that reporting is
higher when the personal inconvenience is low; inconvenience is mea-
sured by the number of police per capita.
Neither of the objective performance measures of the police
—
clearance rate or stolen property recovery rate—was associated with
reporting ratios, nor was the public evaluation of police performance
associated with the reporting ratio. Surprisingly, the average loss
per property crime was not a significant determinant of crime reporting.
Analysis of individual victimization data found a strong association
between loss and reporting [9]. The failure of this association to be
confirmed with the present data may be attributed to the lower varia-
tion in average losses between cities as compared with variation in
losses of individuals within a given city.
Among the four specific property crimes, auto theft reporting was
not associated with any of the variables. Auto theft differs, in
important ways from the other types of theft. First, there is a rela-
tively high reporting ratio for this type of crime— 73% in the sample
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Table 1 - Property Crimes
Dependent Variable - Crime Reporting Ratio for:
Independent
Variables
:
Property
Recovery Ratio
Average Loss,
Specific Crime
Average Loss,
All Property Crimes
Clearance Rate,
Specific Crime
Clearance Rate,
All Property Crimes
Property Crimes
per Capita
Police Officers
per Capita
Percent of Population
Evaluating Police
Performance as 'Good'
All Crimes Auto Personal Personal
of Theft Theft Larceny
With Contact
Larceny
Without
Contact
-4.42
Burglar;
3.08 2.52 6.90 -8.85
(0.52) (0.38) (0.80) (-0.92) (-1.97)'
—
-.003 -0.03 -0.03 -o.ooo:
(-1.61) (-1.32) (-1.69) (-0.03)
0.00004 — — — —
(1.07)
— 16.39 -.0028 -12.05 8.61
(1.42) (-1.96)* (-1.50) (1.23)
-6.40 — — — —
(-0.54)
77.71 45.29 36.92 62.65 64.68
(3.19)** (1.59) (1.05) (3.21)** (3.31)'
1905. -152.3 1413. 1416. 1099.
(A. 20)** (-0.27) (1.95)* (3.52)** (2.8)*'
0.130 -0.167 0.22 0.079 -0.01
(1.67) (-1.64) (1.84)* (1.16) (-0.14;
Adjusted R~ .40 .07 .27 .4? .41
**Signif icant at 5% level *Significant at 10% level
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cities used. Second, the variation in the reporting ratio between the
cities for this crime was relatively low. No doubt the widespread use
of theft insurance for automobiles effects reporting auto thefts.
The reporting of personal larceny with contact equation produced
two anomalies; first the clearance ratio was significant but with the
opposite sign predicted by the theory. There is no obvious theoretical
reason why higher clearance rates should be associated with lower
reporting ratios. This equation was also the only instance where the
evaluation of police performance by population survey was significant
and positively associated with reporting. The personal larceny with-
out contact reporting ratio was significantly associated with only the
level of property crimes and police officers per capita, but these
associations were strong enough to give this equation the best fit of
any of the five.
The burglary reporting equation was similar in results to the
personal larceny without contact equation except for a significantly
negative coefficient for the property recovery ratio. This is again
the opposite of what the theory would predict; however, it should be
remembered that the property recovery ratio used is for all property
crimes not just burglary; consequently, given the crudeness of the
proxy little importance should be attached to this perverse result.
Among the eight independent variables only the property crimes per
capita and police officers per capita showed any consistent and signi-
ficant association with the crime reporting decision among the cities
in the sample.
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The results for the reporting ratios of crimes of violence are
given in Table 2. The reporting of all crimes of violence collectively
was significantly associated with only two variables, the overall
level of violent crime and the police officers per capita. The signs
of both coefficients were positive as predicted. While the theory
views each of these variables as measuring independent influences on
reporting behavior, given the nature of the criminal justice system,
some positive correlation would be expected between them. One would
expect citizens concern to be highest and political response to be
greatest if their city is experiencing high levels of violent crime.
One positive response produced by this concern would naturally be to
obtain more police protection. We find such a direct association to
be present in the sample, but not overly strong; the simple correlation
is +.47.
The reporting ratio equation for rape is just significant; only
police officers per capita show any association and then only margi-
nally so. This result is not particularly surprising, given the ina-
bility to find any proxies for the personal costs of reporting. The
other specific crime reporting ratios, robbery and aggravated assault
only show a significant positive association with the level of violent
crime as hypothesized.
Since the theory offers no guidance as to the functional form of
the relations, the equations were estimated in logarithmic form; these
results are reported in Tables 3 and 4. The change in functional form
produced very few changes in the pattern of signs and statistical sig-
nificance of the coefficients. The coefficients now, however, represent
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Table 2 - Violent Crimes
Dependent Variable - Crime Reporting Ratio for:
Independent
Variables:
All Violent
Crimes
Rape Robbery Aggravated
Assault
Property
Recoverv Ratio
10.07
(1.38)
Average Loss,
Specific Crime
Property Crimes
per Capita
Clearance Rate,
Specific Crime
Violent Crimes,
per Capita
Total Crimes,
per Capita
Police Officers,
per Capita
Percent of Population
Evaluating Police
o
Adjusted R
.008
(0.71)
— 9.24 5.70 3.72
(0.64) (0.70) (0.50)
525. 216. 539. 375.
(3.82)** (0.59) (2.55)** (2.24)**
-17.4 — — —
(-0.90)
1007. 2139. 987. 472.
(2.44)** (1.74)* (1.53) (0.86)
.028 -.319 .086 -.006
(0.38) (-0.14) (0.68) (-0.06)
.67 .14 .34 .28
**Signif icant at 5% level *Significant at 10% level
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Table 3 - Property Crimes - Variables in Log Form
Dependent Variable - Crime Reporting Ratio for:
Independent
Variables:
Property
Recovery Ratio
Average Loss,
Specific Crime
Average Loss,
All Property Crimes
Clearance Rate,
Specific Crime
Clearance Rate,
All Property Crimes
Property Crimes
per Capita
Police Officers
per Capita
Percent of Population
Evaluating Police
Performance as 'Good'
All Crimes Auto Personal Personal
of Theft Theft Larceny
With Contact
Larceny
Without
Contact
-.0877
Burglary
-.0531 .0137 .0589 -.0623
(-0.73) (0.42) (0.71) (-1.45) (-2.22)
_—
-.0289 -.1098 -.1326 -.0155
(-1.05) (-1.32) (2.16)** (-0.52)
-.0220 __ __ __
(-0.62)
——
.0371 -.1810 -.0970 .0131
(1.46) (2.29)** (-1.67) (0.50)
-.0593 —
_
__ __
(-0.72)
.1975 .0473 .0721 .2078 .0994
(2.51)** (1.28) (.082) (3.25)** (3.16)*
.3302 -.0032 .1764 .2379 .1152
(4.23)** (-0.08) (2.04)** (3.75)** (3.65)*
.2006 -.0886 .2473 .1186 .0418
(1.71)* (-1.46) (1.88)* (1.22) (0.83)
Adjusted R .36 .03 .27 .50 .45
**Signif icant at 5% level *Significant at 10% level
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Table 4 - Violent Crimes - Variables in Log Form
Dependent Variable - Crime Reporting Ratio for:
Independent
Variables:
Property
Recovery Ratio
Average Loss,
Specific Crime
Clearance Rate,
Specific Crime
Violent Crimes,
per Capita
Total Crimes,
per Capita
Police Officers,
per Capita
Percent of Population
Evaluating Police
All Violent Rape Robbery Aggravated
Crimes Assault
— —
.0763
(1.60)
—
— —
.0467
(0.94)
—
—
.1236 .0455 .0592
(0.76) (0.81) (0.62)
.1099 -.0064 .1324 .0596
(2.75)** (-0.06) (2.47)** (1.36)
-.0090 — — —
(-.21)
.1246 .2257 .0910 .0716
(2.82)** (2.00)** (1.70)* (1.38)
.0016 -.0655 .0801 -.0422
(0.02) (-0.35) (0.92) (-0.49)
Adjusted R" ,63 .11 ,34 .23
: *Signif icant at 5% level 'Significant at 10* level
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elasticities— the proportional response of the reporting ratio to
proportional changes in the independent variable. The values of the
elasticities which were significant were generally small, ranging from
0.1 to 0.2. The highest, 0.33, was the response of the reporting
ratio for all property crimes to changes in police per capita. While
this seems high, a more precise framework for evaluating the magni-
tudes of the coefficients will be provided in the following section.
In summary, only two of the eight independent variables show any
consistent significant association with the crime reporting ratios;
these are the crime rate itself and the number of police per capita.
The crime rate was always positive and significant in both of the
aggregated crime types and significant in four of the seven specific
crime equations. Police officers per capita was also positive and
significant in both aggregate crime equations and in four of the spe-
cific crime equations. It is not particularly surprising that none
of the proxies for police performance performed well, as these would
require knowledge of police activities which the typical citizen would
not possess. It is surprising that the general subjective evaluation
of police performance revealed by the population surveys showed almost
no significant relationship with reporting behavior; however this re-
sult is consistent with one analysis of individual reporting decisions
[8], We now explore the implications of these findings for the sta-
tistical analysis of crime rates.
Crime Underreporting and the Statistical Analyses of Crime:
The effect of crime underreporting on the statistical analysis of
crime rates depends, of course, upon the statistical model that is
employed to explain variations in crime rates across the sample units.
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In the literature one finds a range of sophistication in statistical
methods and models ranging from simple zero order correlation to multi-
equation simultaneous equation models. However, given the complexity
of crime causation, a multivariate model as a minimum, would be
required. We will consider the effect of crime underreporting on both
single equation and simultaneous equation models.
A simple single equation model of the true crime rate, c* , with
all variables expressed, in logarithms, is:
(1) c* = ct„ + a o + ot ? p + a_x + e
where: o = police officers per capita
p = average punishment awarded upon conviction
x = other socio-economic or demographic variable,
e.g., level of unemployment
e = error term
a. = oarameters to be estimated
l
If reported crime, c, is a fraction, k, of true crime, then in
logarithms
:
(2) c = c* + k(-) + u
where I<( • ) is a function determining non-random reporting behavior
and u is an error term.
Crime reporting behavior, based upon the earlier analysis, is approxi-
mated in logarithms by:
(3) k = k
Q
+ no + \c
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Substituting (3) into (2) we obtain the reported crime rate as
influenced by reporting behavior:
(4) c* = (l-X)c - k
Q
- no - u
Substituting (4) into (1) and solving for reported crime, c, we obtain
the equation which is actually estimated:
(5) c = j~ [ko + a + (n + a l )o + a2P + a 3x + (e + u)]
The estimated effect of police officers per capita on reported
crime will not be the ct hypothesized in equation (1) but rather a
coefficient reflecting systematic variation in crime reporting as well
as the direct effect, a ; this estimated coefficient, a, is:
(n+a
1
)
(6) a
i - TFxT
To determine whether a will be larger or smaller than a, we
must consider the probable signs of all the terms in the expression.
Theory would predict that a is negative, on the assumption that more
police will increase the risk of arrest and conviction. Both the
theory of crime reporting and estimates given above suggest that n and
X are positive. The effect of n is to bias a downwards, i.e., the
dependence of the reporting ratio on police officers per capita can
lead to a rejection of a true hypothesis that law enforcement acti-
vity, as measured by police per capita, has any effect on reported
crime. The logic is quite straightforward, more police will simul-
taneously reduce crime and increase the proportion of real crime re-
ported; the net impact on reported crime may be nil or even positive.
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In addition, X can also affect the sign as well as the magnitude
of a . If X is greater than unity, it will reverse the sign of a .
However, the evidence on the magnitude of X reported in tables 3 and
4 indicates its value is in the range of .1 to .2; consequently, it
seems unlikely that X will reverse the sign of a . If X is assumed
to be less than unity, the bias will be to increase the absolute value
of a . That is, the effect of X will be to spuriously over-estimate
the impact on the crime rate not only of law enforcement activity but
of all the variables. For example, consider the unemployment rate as
a determinant of the crime rate. A rise in unemployment will increase
the true crime rate and, with a constant reporting ratio, the reported
crime as well. However, if the increased reported crime rate now
increases the reporting ratio, the observed impact of unemployment on
reported crime will be further and spuriously increased.
Since underreporting behavior operates both to increase and to
decrease a we cannot determine, with theory alone, even the direction
of the bias. We can gain some further insight, however, by utilizing
information obtained for the values of n and X from the earlier ana-
lysis and by making some assumptions as to the true value of a .
Theory suggests that a should be negative, thus one bound on possible
true value of a is zero, i.e., police officers per capita has no true
effect on the level of crime. For the other bound we will use -1.0 as
the elasticity of the crime rate to variations in police officers per
capita. The only support we can offer for this as a bound is the
general impression from the literature that crime is relatively insen-
sitive to the level of law enforcement activitv. An elasticitv of 1.0
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would thus seem reasonable as an outside bound. For values of n and
X we use the estimates for property crime and violent crime given in
tables 3 and 4. Using these values and equation (6) we have computed
Table 5.
Table 5
Biased Estimates of a Using Equation (6)
True value
of a
-i-
• •—
-.5
-1.0
Property Crime Rate: Violent Crime Rate:
n = -33; X = .20 n = .12; X = .11
+.41 +.13
+ .24 -.09
-.43
-.42 -.99
Table 5 shows that over the range of values assumed, the effect of
underreporting behavior is to bias the absolute value of a., upwards.
The smaller the true value of a
, the greater the relative bias.
For property crime, the true elasticity would have to be .5 in abso-
lute value or greater before we would even expect the estimate to have
the correct negative sign.
We conclude that for the single equation model we have used, the
systematic component to variations in reporting behavior will bias
towards zero the effect of police per capita on crime rates, but will
bias upwards in absolute value the effects of all other variables.
A simultaneous model is appropriate if the level of crime affects
the level of sanctions as well as the level of sanctions affects the
level of crime. This mutual causation follows from an assumption that
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one or more units of the criminal justice system has a capacity con-
straint. For example, it is argued that increased crime produces an
increased workload for the police and as a result, with constant
resources, reduces their ability to solve crimes— the clearance rate
declines. A similar argument may be applied to the courts or to pri-
sons. An increased case load for the prosecutors or judges may lead
to greater use of negotiated pleas, thus reducing the charge and the
average punishment. Similarly, parole board decisions may be
influenced by the prison population relative to prison capacity. As
a rise in crime pushes prisons to capacity parole boards may more
readily grant parole to avoid overcrowding and thus again reduce the
average sentence served.
Some degree of simultaneity between crime and sanctions has become
a standard assumption in econometric models. A good example of such a
model is that of Carr-Hill and Stern; they also introduce the possibi-
lity of crime underreporting in their model [3]. An abridged version
of their model with all variables in logarithms is:
(7) c* = a p* + a o + a~x + a_ + e
(3) p = Be + S ? o + 8 3y + e Q + e 2
(9) o = YjC + Y ? p + Y 3z + Yq + e3
(10) p* + c* i p + c
(11) c = c* + k(«) + u
-22-
where c = reported crime rate
c* = true crime rate
p = probability of punishment based upon the reported
crime rate, e.g., the police clearance rate
p* = probability of punishment based upon the true crime
rate
o = police officers per capita
x,y,z = other exogenous variables
k = crime reporting ratio
k(*) = function determining reporting behavior
e
.
, u = error terms
I
a 6 ,y, = parameters to be estimated
Equation (7) gives the true level of crime as a function of the
true risk of punishment, police officers per capita and other exogenous
variables, e.g., the unemployment rate or age distribution of the popu-
lation. This specification assumes that police officers per capita
have two effects on the true level of crime; an indirect effect which
operates through the true probability of punishment and second, a direct
effect. That is, some criminals may measure risk through the actual
level of punishment while others may infer risk by direct observation
of the number of police present.
Most econometric models implicitly assume that only the direct
effect is operative. Such an assumption facilitates identification
and is consistent with the theory which assumes that potential cri-
minals are 'rational', i.e., they know the true risk. However, there
is no evidence as to how potential offenders actually determine risk
[21].
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Equation (8) is a punishment production function where the inputs
are the number of police and the number of crimes plus other factors.
Equation (9) describes the major determinants of the number of police
per capita; it assumes that the political process which establishes
police department budgets is sensitive to the level of reported crime
and the level of probability of punishment as well as other variables.
Equation (10) is an identity which simply states that the number of
crimes cleared equals the number of crimes cleared; it permits the
replacement of p* with observed variables. Equation (11) assumes that
reported crime is some fraction, k, of the true level of crime. Equa-
tions (10) and (11) are needed to replace the true, but unobservable,
values of crime and punishment in equation (7) with observed or
reported values.
Substituting (10) and (11) into (7) to eliminate c* and p* , we
obtain an equation for reported crime:
(12) c = o p + k(«)(l+a ) + u(l+ct ) + a ? o + ax + a f + e
Based upon the findings of our earlier analysis we assume that the
crime reporting ratio is determined as follows:
(13) k(-) = k + Ac + no
o
where k is a constant, X and n are parameters,
o
r
Substituting (13) into (1^) we obtain:
(14) C = l-\(l+ct )
{a
l P
+ [(1+a
l
)n + a^° + (1+a l )ko + a 3X + a
+ (l+o )u + e
x
>
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The term in front of the braces is introduced by the dependence of the
reporting ratio on the level of reported crime; it introduces a bias
to all of the coefficients in the equation. Assuming that a is nega-
tive and less than one in absolute value and that X is positive but
less than one, then the bias from this source will be to increase all
of the coefficients in absolute value. If a, were exactly minus one
in value, then there would be no bias; if it were larger than one in
absolute value, then the bias would reduce all of the coefficients in
absolute value.
There is an additional source of bias to the coefficient for
police per capita, a ? ; this bias is introduced by the dependence of
the reporting ratio on police per capita. The estimated coefficient,
a
9 , taking account of both sources of bias, is:
(1+a )n + a9
(15) a
2
=
1 - A(l+cO
The expression on the right hand side of (16) cannot be evaluated
as to the direction of the bias without some assumptions for the
values of the parameters. To explore the qualitative nature of the
bias, we assume that a and a ? are negative and less than unity and
use values for A and n estimated from reporting behavior for property
crimes and violent crimes and reported in Tables 3 and 4. With these
assumed values we can evaluate equation (15) for various combinations
of values; these results are given in Table 6.
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Table 6
Biased Estimates of a Using Equation (15)
Property Crime Reporting: Violent Crime Reporting:
(n = .3; X = .2) (n = .1; A = .1)
Assumed Assumed true value of a„: Assumed true value of a„:
value
of a
1
: -.2 -.5 -1.0 -.2 -.5 -1.0
+.38 +.13 -.25 -.88 +.11 -.11 -.44 -1.0
-.2 +.28 +.05 -.31 -.90 +.09 -.13 -.46 -1.0
-.5 +.17 -.06 -.39 -.94 +.05 -.16 -.47 -1.0
-1.0 -.2 -.5 -1.0 -.2 -.5 -1.0
The magnitude of the bias of the police officers per capita coeffi-
cient is relatively minor for crimes of violence over the range of
values used in Table 6. Only for quite small true values of a~ is the
bias at all large in percentage terms. For property crimes, however,
the magnitude of the bias is much greater, over 50% in many cases.
This difference is due, of course, to the stronger dependence of the
reporting ratio on the crime level and number of police per capita.
In every instance the bias is towards increasing the estimated value
relative to the true value; since the true value should be negative
if the presence of police deter crime, the bias will tend to reduce
the measured direct impact of police on crime.
In summary, we have found that the bias from underreporting of
crime has the same general impact in the simultaneous model as in the
single equation model. The dependence of reporting behavior on the
reported level of crime will bias all coefficients upwards in absolute
value, i.e., the bias will tend to lead to a spurious rejection of the
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null hypothesis. The impact of the dependence of reporting behavior
on police per capita will tend to bias the coefficient of police per
capita towards zero, i.e., to lead to a spurious rejection of the null
hypothesis. This source of bias is sufficiently strong that it domi-
nates the total bias from both sources for plausible ranges of the
relevant parameters. Further, the smaller the true effect of police
per capita on crime, the larger the total bias in percentage terms.
That is, a small true value will not only be difficult to find because
of sampling error but also because the bias is relatively larger when
the true value is small.
These results point to yet another complication to the already
difficult problem of statistically evaluating the relationship between
police—either police officers or police expenditures per capita—and
crime levels. For a discussion of these other problems see [4], [11],
[21].
Before concluding, the limitations of the data upon which this
study is based should be noted. First, we have used city data; much
of the statistical analyses of crime rates have utilized state level
data. It is uncertain whether the findings of this analysis would
extend to the more aggregative level data. Further, the size range
of the cities is relatively restricted; most of the cities are quite
large. Finally, the victimization survey data upon which we have
relied for crime reporting data also have measurement problems [13],
Conclusions :
We have shown that there exists a systematic component to the
variation in crime underreporting at the city level. The implications
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of this component are more general than those which follow from the
random component. That is, the systematic dependence of the crime
reporting ratio on the level of reported crime will bias all of the
coefficients in the crime equation, not just the sanction variables
formed with the reported crime rate in the denominator. This bias
will operate to produce a spurious effect of each variable on the
crime rate, independent of any true effect. In this sense, it
operates like the random variation in crime underreporting on sanc-
tion variables, but with opposite effects.
It is interesting to note that the size of the general bias pro-
duced by the dependence of reporting on the crime rate, in the simul-
taneous equation model, depends upon the size of the punishment
coefficient, a
,
a variable which has been shown to be biased by the
random variation in reporting. It is beyond the scope of this paper
to explore the combined effects of these two biases. However, since
the effects of the random variation have been analyzed only in very
simple models, it appears that monte carlo studies will be required
to analyze both sources of bias in simultaneous equation models.
The importance of measurement error effects stressed by the report
of the Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects
appears to be justified. However, a_ priori we cannot be sure as to
the direction of these effects. Consequently, if statistical studies
based upon reported crime rates are to provide any policy guidance it
is important that the total impact of all of the sources of bias be
established.
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